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ABSTRACT

As an increasing amount of our lives is spent interacting online through social media
platforms, more and more people tend to seek out and consume social media information
rather than traditional ways. The pervasive use of social media produces massive data
at an unprecedented speed. It is cheap to provide information online and much faster to
disseminate through social media. Large volumes of fake data are produced online for various
purposes, such as financial and political gain. Social media platforms prove to be a popular
venue whereby vendors can post illicit drug ads with relative ease, expansive reach, and little

cost. We present two machine learning methods to detect illicit ads on Google+ and use
graph theories to detect communities who post spam on social media.
However, there is one significant drawback that it needs labeled data to help the classification process. The posts are too many to be tagged, making the labeling data procedure
tedious and time-consuming, preventing the previous framework from effectively and efficiently. One way is to keep the user in the loop to ask users to mark the posts. Nevertheless,
users’ concerns about their privacy have risen sharply in recent years. Federated learning
provided an alternative approach to train models without collecting users’ data. There are
two main problems in this structure. The first one is to what extent we can trust our users’
reports. We may even have some users intentionally report regular posts. We design a
weighted federated averaging framework, a system to evaluate each user’s credit to detect
attackers or dishonest users. The natural idea comes from finding out the poor performance returned local models through a testing procedure. Furthermore, it is a challenge
for the global model to obtain good performance across different devices, say, not fair to all
users. Considering that clients have similar behaviors or features, we organize the clients
into groups, give each cluster a weight according to the clustering results, and select the
participator across these clusters to train the global model.
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PART 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Background and motivation
Nowadays, more and more people prefer seeking out information from social media

rather than traditional ways. Research from [1] shows that social media outperforms television as the primary news source. People can obtain information from social media timely
and then further comment on and share with friends. However, the quality of posts on social
media is one primary concern. For the traditional resources, the contents are usually wellchecked. On the other hand, fake information on social media is easy and cheap to publish.
It is also easier and faster to disseminate information online than in traditional ways.
Take the opioid epidemic as an example. One driver of the drug epidemic is enhanced
drug accessibility and promotion that is facilitated via the Internet. Online drug trading
platforms have emerged and are flourishing [2]. Social media platforms prove to be a popular
venue whereby vendors can post illicit drug ads with relative ease, expansive reach, and with
little cost. On the consumer side, drug users are able to search and find numerous vendors
selling a wide range of illicit substances complete with drug information, user reviews, and
encrypted web-based sale capabilities [3, 4]. Unlike traditional street drug transactions,
eCommerce enables illicit drug vendors to connect and complete sales orders with drug users
via social media, which bypasses direct personal contact entirely and essentially makes illicit
drug sales as efficient and effective as any other online purchase. Results from a national
survey on social media use from [5] indicate that an estimated 70% of U.S. adults ever use
social media. In our research, we found that illicit drug ads are ubiquitous within most
social media platforms. The order can be directly delivered to a specific pickup location
without the disclosure of identifiable information. However, the opioid abuse epidemic is
a national crisis seriously affecting public health, causing preventable harm and premature
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death, and devastating communities. In 2017, 70,467 Americans died of drug overdoses that
year, representing an increase of 10 percent over the 63,938 opioid overdose deaths recorded
in 2016 [6]. As such, effective and efficient surveillance tools in digital platforms are needed
to monitor the activities of online drug sellers and prevent the increasing criminal use of the
Internet to advertise illicit drugs. We reused some work from our published works [7, 8, 9, 10]
to address and solve the problems indicated in this paper.

1.2

Detect Illicit Ads on Social Media Using Maching Learning
The drug abuse epidemic has been facilitated by modern information technology and

the rise of illicit drug trading platforms. With an estimated 4.1 billion persons worldwide
regularly using the Internet in 2018 [11], drug vendors can efficiently and effectively reach
drug consumers via online social media platforms. Online drug trading is both more efficient
and less risky than traditional drug market exchanges, since the buyer does not need to
connect with the seller in person. An open question concerns the ectent to which the current
opioid abuse epidemic is facilitated by the proliferation of social media. In our research, we
found that most social media platforms are used extensivelyfor illicit drug advertising. Many
ads contain vendors’ phone numbers, emails, Wickr IDs, and websites. Buyers can contact
drug vendors using these communication methods to order drugs for delivery to a specified
pickup location. Purchasing illicit drugs online seemingly has become as straightforward as
making an Amazon purchase. It is therefore of paramount importance that public health
and law enforcement personnel have access to efficient tools for monitoring online drug
transactions using traditional epidemiological surveillance methods to inform the design of
appropriate response strategies.
we develop a computational framework for detecting illicit ads in Google+, one of the
largest social media platforms. We first captured relevant data posts via Google+ APIs, and
then applied binary classification methods to analyze the text data in the posts. The textual
analyses were used to identify illicit drug ads. We employed two methods in our approach:
1. the support vector machine (SVM) and 2. the convolutional neural network (CNN).
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The SVM-based method allowed for term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF)
extraction of terms, which were subsequently applied to SVM for prediction [12, 13]. The
CNN-based methodology was applied to social media posts for text classification [14]. The
first approach (SVM) required a precursory feature selection, while the second approach
(CNN) automatically learns features from the text data.

1.3

Computational Approaches to Detect Illicit Drug Ads and Find Vendor
Communities Within Social Media Platforms
Another surveillance avenue distinct from ads is to discover active vendors through

detecting vendor communities. One confirmed active vendor would be helpful for law enforcement to identify multiple vendors linked by the same illicit substances automatically. It
would also contribute to disrupting the growth of illicit drug markets [15]. However, discovering the communities of vendors is a challenging problem since there is no direct connection
between vendors. Identifying meaningful communities in real-world networks has proven
to be a challenging task [16, 17]. In our research, we observed that a number of vendors
might sell an exclusive substance, such as fentanyl or heroin only. Our identification of
these vendors revealed their attempts to recruit distributors via social media posts. These
observations led to the discovery of vendor communities. For our purposes, a community is
classified as a group of nodes having more connections with the members in the same group
than in the other groups or the remaining of the network[18]. There may exist active connections for vendors in the same community which may reveal patterns of their corresponding
networks[19].
In this part, we select Google+, Flickr and Tumblr as the data source for illicit ad
detection and vendor communities detection. For vendors’ communities detection, there
are three tasks. The first one is to identify the unique vendors across social platforms since
vendors may have different accounts on different social platforms. We assume the same phone
number on different social platforms from the same vendor. The second task is to extract
the drugs in the illicit drug ads. It is a big challenge to extract the drug names since the
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illicit drug posts are in an unstructured form. A long-short term memory-based method [20]
is applied to extract drug names from unstructured posts to deal with this problem. The last
task is to figure out the communities of vendors. We build a bipartite graph by using drug
categories and vendors as two different types of nodes. The communities can be overlapped
since one vendor can belong to two or more communities. Thus an overlapping community
detection algorithm is needed. We adopt a matrix factorization based method [21] to detect
the communities of vendors.

1.4

User-in-the-loop: Crowd-sourcing Federated Learning
We find that machine learning-related techniques could be applied to efficiently detect

illicit posts or spam through the previous two sections. Nevertheless, there is one significant
drawback that it always needs labeled data to help the classification process. The posts are
too many to be tagged, making the labeling data procedure tedious and time-consuming,
which prevents the previous framework from effectively and efficiently. In industrial applications, steaming data makes things worse. One way is to keep the user in the loop to ask
users to mark the posts. However, users’ concerns about their privacy have risen sharply
in recent years. For example, data breaches have alarmed and warned many users about
their private information leakage. Some users may concern their privacy and safety then not
report those illicit posts.
In order to address the above problem, recently, federated learning (FL) provided an
alternative approach and became an emerging research paradigm to train models on private
data distributed over multiple devices [22, 23]. Unlike traditional machine learning to protect
privacy at the network level or the user level [24], the crucial point of FL is that the users’
training data does not leave their devices. One of the most popular tools in FL is Federated
Averaging (FedAvg) [23]. This FL system selects several available devices and sends them a
shared model at each round to be trained [23]. The selected devices compute updates to the
model with their local data, and the updates are aggregated at the central system [23]. This
process is repeated several times until the model has converged [23]. In order to correctly
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Figure (1.1) Keep users in the loop with FL

label available data for model training, now services are increasingly leveraging the power of
human-in-the-loop (HITL) machine learning. The loop in HITL refers to the role of human
feedback in the AI training process. Figure 1.1 shows the steps we are applying federated
learning to detect spam if we keep users in the training loop. However, there are two main
problems in this structure. We will address the two problems in the following two sections.

1.5

A Weighted Federated Averaging Framework to Reduce the Negative Influence from the Dishonest Users
The first one is to what extent we can trust our users’ reports. We may even have some

users intentionally report regular posts. The fake local model then brings much harm in
aggregating the demand of the shared model. First, it slows down the convergence of the
global model, which wastes many computing resources and communication time.
We design a system to evaluate each user’s credit to detect attackers or dishonest devices
to deal with this problem. The difficulty lies in effectively picking up those who give the
noise to our model without treating the honest to the bad one. In this part, we prepare a
test dataset to verify every returned local model, give a weight based on the testing accuracy
and then apply a time series averaging method to give weight to each user to merge into the
global model. The natural idea comes from finding out the poor performance returned local
models through a testing procedure. Although it seems to add extra steps and, in turn, cost
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extra time, the whole procedure will boost the convergence of the global model due to the
high demand of the communication cost.

1.6

A Cluster-based Solution to Achieve Fairness in Federated Learning
The second problem in FL applications is that FL generally faces non-independent and

identical data (non-i.i.d) [25] and unbalanced data. It is a challenge for the global model
to obtain good performance across different devices. For FedAvg, naively selecting samples
from all clients evenly may provide the advantage of better performance over some of these
devices. However, selecting samples with equality could decrease the model performance on
some devices, although the average accuracy may be good enough. For instance, Figure 1.2
shows the type of photos people posted on Instagram [26], and there are 5 clusters with a
different number of users. The size of cluster 5 in Figure 1.2 is 7.3 times the size of cluster
4. The global model learned from FedAvg could be biased toward the users from cluster 5
since around half of the participants at each round may be from cluster 5.

Figure (1.2) User clusters based on the type of figures

Our goal is to find a fair solution to train a global model that has a similar performance
on every device in this part. Considering that clients have similar behaviors or features, we
organize the clients into groups, give each cluster a weight according to the clustering results,
and then select the participator across these clusters to train the global model. We adapt
the hierarchical clustering to deal with the problem that the number of clusters is unknown.
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The clustering method’s input is from the training weights, which ensures that no raw data
is exposed. Meanwhile, to make sure the global model achieves a similar performance across
different devices, say, fairness, we reduce the number of the clients in larger groups to be
selected to participate in training, and at the same time, increase the number of participators
from small groups. In this way, minor devices’ accuracy is improved significantly at the low
cost of the majority of devices’ accuracy. The accuracy from each device is similar to the
average accuracy, which accomplishes our goal, fair to every device.

1.7

Dissertation Organization
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows: Part 2 summarizes the related

works; Part 3 presents two machine learning methods to detect illicit ads on Google+. Part
4 extends the work from part 3 and uses graph theories to detect communities who post
spam on social media. Part 5 proposed a weighted averaging-based algorithm to deal with
the dishonest users’ reports when applying federated learning for spam detection in social
media. Part 6 proposed a cluster-based method to deal with the large volume of users when
applying federated learning for spam detection in social media.
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PART 2

RELATED WORK

2.1

Online illicit drug ads detection
Illicit online drug trade has been the subject of several epidemiological and sociological

studies. In particular, Mackey et al. [27] created a fictitious advertisement, offering consumers a way to buy drugs without a prescription. The advertisement was posted on four
social media platforms: Facebook, Twitter, MySpace and Google+. Eventually one of these
accounts was blocked due to suspicious activity, but the remaining fake illicit drug advertisements were easily accessible during the duration of the experiment. A study conducted
by Stroppa et al. [28] revealed that one-fifth of collected posts advertise counterfeit and/or
illicit products online. Their research emphasized that detection of illegal cyber-vendors
and online tactics requires development and application of sophisticated and tailored screening/detection methods.
On the computational side, development of tools for detection of malicious and/or undesired advertisements in social media has been a subject of several studies. Hu et al. [29]
provided a framework for detection of spammers on microblogging. Zheng and colleagues [30]
proposed a SVM-based machine learning model to detect spammer behavior on Sina Weibo.
Agrawal et. al [31] introduced an unsupervised method called Reliability-based Stochastic
Approach for Link-Structure Analysis, which can be used to detect topical posts on social
media. Jain et al. [32] used convolutional and long short-term memory (LSTM) neural networks to detect spam in social media, while addressing the challenges of text mining on short
posts.
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2.2

Cyber-Vendor Community Detection
There are several studies for community detection methods in the real bipartite graph.

Isah et al. provided a bipartite graph model to infer hidden ties in crime data in 2015 [33].
Marin et al. Marin et al. proposed a novel model based on machine learning to find overlapped communities of malware vendors [19]. They used the categories of malware products
and malware vendors to build the bipartite graph. They also provide ways to validate communities since there is no benchmark for the real-world network. For drug vendors, Duxbury
et al. detect communities of opioid vendors on a darknet cryptomarket [15]. They characterized the network structure of vendors and buyers.
2.2.1 Computational Algorithms
Named Entity Recognition Supervised machine learning methods are popular for
Named Entity Recognition (NER), such as Support Vector Machines, Conditional Random
Fields [34]. Lafferty et al. first introduced CRFs in 2001 [35]. The Stanford Natural Language Processing Group proposed a 7 class model trained on the MUC 6 and MUC 7 training
data sets [36] which can recognize Location, Person, Organization, Money, Percent, Date,
Time in text data. Conditional Random Field (CRF) sequence models are used in Stanford NER software. Recently, Neural networks for NER become prevalent since the neural
network does not need much feature selection [34]. Collobert et al. first provided a wordlevel Neural Network model [37] for NER. Moreover, deep learning models and supervised
machine learning methods are combined for NER. Huang et al. proposed a bidirectional
long-short term memory with conditional random fields which achieved a high F1-score on
English CoNLL 2003 dataset [20].
Community Detection Community detection is a central problem in machine learning and data mining since the 1980s. Depending on the properties from different networks,
there are various algorithms to complete community detection tasks through identifying
partitions of interacting nodes [21]. Infomap [38] and Louvain [39] are two state-of-the-art
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algorithms which on the basis of data mining techniques. Infomap is optimizing weighted
modularity based on random walk dynamics [38]. Louvain, a greedy optimization technique
of Newman-Girvan modularity [40], can unfold communities in large networks [39]. Both of
OSLOM [41] and CNM [42] are based on machine learning algorithms. OSLOM searches
for clusters by optimizing an important score locally [41]. It can deal with different types
of graphs. CNM [42] is a fast hierarchical agglomeration algorithm for community detection
in large scale network. It can cope with millions of nodes. Walktrap, a popular community
detection method, is based on the combination of data mining and machine learning [43].
It is a hierarchical clustering algorithm by estimating the similarity between pairs of nodes
based on random walk dynamics [43].
From the structural properties in our work, we focus on the studies for community detection in the bipartite graph. Barber proposed a model called Bipartite Recursively Induced
Modules (BRIM) to detect communities in the bipartite network [44]. The goal of BRIM is
finding out the optimal value of modules and then bringing out the community division. For
example, using one red node starts from an arbitrary partition in red nodes and retrieves
the partition of the blue nodes, which is in turn as input to find a better partition of red
nodes, and iterating until modularity converges [45]. During the recursive process, the modularity Q is guaranteed to increase or at least to keep the previous modularity. Thus, the
BRIM model will always find the divisions of communities at an optimal value of Q [45].
The BRIM method can also be used for determining the number of communities in the
bipartite network [45]. Du et al. offered a novel algorithm called Bi-community Detector
(BiTector) to discover the communities in the bipartite graph [46]. They use bi-cliques as the
main ingredients to detect communities [47]. Yang and Leskovec proposed Cluster Affiliation
Model for Big Networks (BigClam) for detecting communities [21]. This community detection method is based on Non-negative Matrix Factorization (NMF) to discover the affiliation
weight between a node and a community.
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2.3

Federated Learning
The privacy preservation [48] is more important than ever before because of the massive

data generated from Social Networks[49, 50, 51, 52, 53], IoT [54, 55, 56, 57], Smart City [58,
59, 60, 61], Industry 4.0 [62], etc. To preserve privacy in AI training, the concept of FL was
first introduced in [23]. It can train the global model without leak the users’ privacy. The
server selects users as participants to distribute the shared model to the IoT devices. The
participants use their raw data to train the model and return the model to the server. The
users’ raw data keep on their own devices. The server will aggregate the returned models,
and then the server repeats the procedure many times until the model become stable. This
strategy gives research organizations and industries a novel solution to train a model without
touching users’ raw data, which in turn protects users’ privacy.
There are some sophisticated federated learning methods published recently. In [63], Zhu
and Jin provide a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm to reduce the communication time.
Meanwhile, the global model can be trained efficiently, especially in a scalable environment,
by encoding the network connectivity. The methods from reinforcement learning under
federated learning also offered effective solutions under federated settings [64, 65]. In [66],
Smith et al. provide a multi-task based federated learning method. The theory deals with
high communication cost and fault tolerance under federated settings. In [67], Kang et
al. give reliable federated learning on mobile networks. They use consortium blockchain
techniques to manage the users’ reputation. The simulations show that their method can
improve the reliability of the global model [67].
The research related to privacy on the IoT devices [68, 69], no matter from big IoT
data [70] or traffic flow IoT data [71, 72, 73, 74], these algorithms all require collecting the
data to the server, which increases the risk of exposing clients’ data. In [75], the authors
provided two approaches, structured updates and sketched updates, that reduce the communication cost to improve communication efficiency. In [76], Takayuki and Ryo proposed
a novel method called FedCS for client selection in FL. FedCS selects clients based on their
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resource conditions such as poor quality connection, limited computing power and many
more. Keith et al. provided a secure FL method, where they apply a Secure Aggregation
protocol to protect the model gradient from each user[77].

2.4

Fairness in ML
Fairness in machine learning (ML) is also a broad topic. Generally, fairness could be

from a legal, political, or moral aspect [78, 79], such as age, gender. Skirpan and Gorelick
discussed “what is fair in ML” in [80]. They argued that vulnerable communities should also
be seriously considered in ML problems. It is worth noting that there is plenty of research
done on fairness in ML, but they may not be applicable in FL since the data are all locally
stored during the learning process. Recently, several algorithms performed well in terms of
fairness in FL settings. In [81], a method called agnostic federated learning was introduced.
This method improves the centralized model’s performance on the worst domain and also
ensures that fairness is naturally achieved. Li et al. provided a new method called q-FFL,
which dynamically gives higher weights to the devices with higher loss [82]. They also defined
fairness of performance distribution in FL by using a term: uniformity [82]. The variance of
testing accuracy is one approach to evaluate the uniformity of performance distribution.
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PART 3

DETECTING ILLICIT DRUG ADS IN GOOGLE+ USING MACHINE
LEARNING

3.1

Introduction
The opioid abuse epidemic is a national crisis seriously affecting public health, causing

preventable harm and premature death, and devastating communities. In 2017, 70,467
Americans died of drug overdoses that year, representing an increase of 10 percent over the
63,938 opioid overdose deaths recorded in 2016 [6]. In this chapter, we show our published
work with several slightly modifications [7].
The drug abuse epidemic has been facilitated by modern information technology and
the rise of illicit drug trading platforms. With an estimated 4.1 billion persons worldwide
regularly using the Internet in 2018 [11], drug vendors can efficiently and effectively reach
drug consumers via online social media platforms. Online drug trading is both more efficient
and less risky than traditional drug market exchanges, since the buyer does not need to
connect with the seller in person. An open question concerns the ectent to which the current
opioid abuse epidemic is facilitated by the proliferation of social media. In our research, we
found that most social media platforms are used extensivelyfor illicit drug advertising. Many
ads contain vendors’ phone numbers, emails, Wickr IDs, and websites. Buyers can contact
drug vendors using these communication methods to order drugs for delivery to a specified
pickup location. Purchasing illicit drugs online seemingly has become as straightforward as
making an Amazon purchase. It is therefore of paramount importance that public health
and law enforcement personnel have access to efficient tools for monitoring online drug
transactions using traditional epidemiological surveillance methods to inform the design of
appropriate response strategies.
We develop a computational framework for detecting illicit ads in Google+, one of the
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largest social media platforms. We first captured relevant data posts via Google+ APIs, and
then applied binary classification methods to analyze the text data in the posts. The textual
analyses were used to identify illicit drug ads. We employed two methods in our approach:
1. the support vector machine (SVM) and 2. the convolutional neural network (CNN).
The SVM-based method allowed for term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF)
extraction of terms, which were subsequently applied to SVM for prediction [12, 13]. The
CNN-based methodology was applied to social media posts for text classification [14]. The
first approach (SVM) required a precursory feature selection, while the second approach
(CNN) automatically learns features from the text data.

3.2

Methods
In this section, we describe two methods for classifying social media posts based on

Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) approaches. For
both methods, the inputs are text data extracted from Google+ posts, and the outputs are
the predicted labels indicating whether each post is an illicit drug ad.
3.2.1 The SVM-based Method
The proposed method pipeline consists of two stages: pre-processing and classification.
Pre-processing Steps. At this stage, text posts collected from social media are transformed into numerical feature vectors, which are further used as the inputs for the SVM
classifier. It is a crucial part of traditional text mining methods because the selected features affect the performance of the classifier. Figure 3.1 shows the general scheme of the
pre-processing stage.
Pre-processing consists of three steps. In the first step, the stop words considered noise
are removed. In the second step, the root of a word is isolated by removing tenses of verbs,
which is also referred to as stemming [83]. In the third step, the term frequency-inverse
document frequency (TF-IDF) features are determined [84]. The TF-IDF is the product
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Figure (3.1) Pre-processing steps

of two statistics: term-frequency and inverse document frequency. The term frequency is
calculated based on the raw count of a term (word). The inverse document frequency is a
measure of how much information the word provides. For a term(word) t in a document d,
the weight is calculated as [85]:

w(t, d) = tft,d · log

N
,
dfi

(3.1)

where tft,d is the number of occurrences of word t in document d, dfi is the total number of
documents which contain the word t and N is the total number of documents.
Support Vector Machine (SVM) Classification . TF-IDF features computed at
the pre-processing step are used to train an SVM model that can be further used to predict
labels of new posts. SVM is a classical supervised learning method, which constructs a
hyperplane in a multidimensional euclidean space to serve as a separator for feature vectors
from two classes. We used the radial basis function (RBF) kernel SVM classifier, whose
accuracy was assessed using a ten-fold cross-validation process on a labeled post text dataset
manually curated by human experts.
3.2.2 The CNN-Based Method
This method uses the TextCNN approach [14], which first computes a word embedding
and then applies the convolutional neural networks (CNN) to perform the classification.
TextCNN does not require the removal of stop words or stemming.
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Word embedding. Word embedding which maps words or phrases to numerical vectors, was utilized to allow neural networks to process the text data. We used Word2vec,
a commonly used word embedding model [86] that relies on the combination of skip-grams
and continuous bag-of-words (CBOW) procedures [87]. CBOW generates a word based on
the context, while skip-grams generates the context from a word. For example, if we treat
{“Washington D.C.”, “is”, “the United States”} as a context, then CBOW will generate the
word “capital”. If given the word “capital”, skip-grams will be able to predict the following
words: ‘Washington D.C.”, “is”, “the United States”. The numerical vectors generated by
word2vec are used as the input of CNN.

Figure (3.2) Illustration of TextCNN
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Convolutional Neural Networks. TextCNN contains a single layer of neural net,
which allows it to be highly scalable yet sensitive in performing text classification. Figure 3.2
shows the general scheme of TextCNN [88]. Let d be the dimension of word vector. Given
a sentence “Buy drugs on social media without prescription” and d = 5, we can generate
a sentence matrix in Figure 3.2. Then feature maps are generated by filters operating
convolutions on the sentence matrix. Here we set the region sizes to 2, 3 and 4, and each
region size has two filters. A max-pooling operation is applied to the feature map to retrieve
the largest number. Therefore we can take six features from six feature maps and concatenate
them together to get a feature vector which will serve as the input of the softmax layer.
Finally, we complete a binary classification by using this feature vector through softmax
layer.

3.3

Experimental Results
In this section, we will describe the data collection and data processing, and then eval-

uate the performance of the SVM-based and CNN-based methods. All tools have been implemented in Python 2.7, and run on a DELL workstation with Intel Xeon E5-1603 2.80GHz
CPU, 32G memory, and Ubuntu 18.04 OS.
3.3.1 Data Collection
The data have been collected using Google+ API. The analyzed dataset has been formed
by posts containing at least one of the following 30 keywords [89]:
opioid, alprazolam, amphetamine, antidepressant, benzodiazepine, buprenorphine, cocaine,
diazepam, fentanyl, heroin, hydrocodone, meth, methadone, morphine, naloxone, narcan,
opana, opiate, overdose, oxycodone, oxymorphone, percocet, suboxone, subutex, pill, rehab,
sober, withdrawal, shooting up, track marks
In total, 1,162,445 posts published from 2018/01/01 to 2018/10/31 have been collected.
We labeled all the posts manually. The following examples illustrate examples of illicit drug
ads from the dataset. Ads 1-3 are selling illicit drugs while ad 4 is a normal post.
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1. Buy pain pills and other research chemicals. We do offer discount as well to bulk
buyers. Overnight Shipping with tracking numbers provided. Stay to enjoy our services.Overnight shipping with a tracking number provided for your shipment(Fast,safe
and reliable delivery). We ship within USA, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, GERMANY,
POLAND, SWEDEN, NEW ZEALAND and many other countries not listed here.
2. Hello we supply high quality medication and high rated pharmaceutical opioid at affordable prices. Dear buyers we bring you The Best Of real pharmaceutical product
such as oxycodone, nembutal powder, fentanyl patch and fentanyl powder, subutex,
adderal, demerol, hydrocodone MDMA etc, and only serious buyers should contact
please.
3. Hello, I am a vendor in high quality pharmaceutical products like Xanax, Oxycodone,
Fentanyl patch, Viagra, Diazapam, Percoset, Opana, Methadone, etc and also high
quality medical marijuana strains like Og kush, Sativa, Kief,S hatter, Girls Scott,
Lemon haze, Moon rock, Afghan kush, Purple haze etc, my packaging is very safe and
discreet, also my delivery is 100% assured as we do refund or resend the same order
immediately in case of any unforeseen.
4. Highlighting concerns with the pharmaceutical supply chain, the Food and Drug Administration warned McKesson, one of the nation’s largest wholesalers, for failing to
properly handle episodes where pharmacies received tampered medicines, including
three ...
FDA scolds McKesson for naproxen in tampered oxycodone bottles -STAT3.3.2 Effectiveness Evaluation
We use precision, recall and F-score as metrics to evaluate the accuracy of the classification methods [90]. Precision is defined as the ratio of predicted and ground-truth
illicit ads among all predicted illicit ads, i.e., Prec = tp/(tp + fp).

Recall is defined

as the ratio of predicted and ground-truth illicit ads among all ground-truth illicit ads,
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i.e., Recall = tp/(tp + fn). The F-score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall:
F-score = 2 · Prec · Recall/(Prec + Recall). We use 10-fold cross-validation procedures to
evaluate the accuracy of both the SVM and CNN based methods.
Table (3.1) Accuracy of the SVM based method and TextCNN
Methods
SVM Based Method
TextCNN

Pre
0.65
0.97

Recall
0.81
0.90

F-score
0.72
0.93

In TextCNN, we set the parameters as follows: max sequence length 20, embedding dim
200, validation split 0.16, test split 0.2 [88]. Table 3.1 shows the precision, recall, and F-score
for SVM and TextCNN. From Table 3.1, we can see that TextCNN outperforms SVM in all
metrics.
Table 3.2 shows the running time. In Table 3.2, the training time represents the average
running times for training ten SVM or CNN models during the ten-fold cross-validation
procedure. The number of posts in the input dataset for training each model is 1,046,200,
which is 90% of the total of 1,162,445 posts. The testing time represents the average running
time of predicting the label of a single post. In each iteration of the ten-fold cross-validation,
the input number of posts is 116,244 posts. We measure the average time for each post.
From Table 3.2, we can see that the SVM based method takes less than 1 hour while the
TextCNN method takes 11 hours for training. Both methods take less than 0.05 second for
prediction.
Table (3.2) Running time of the SVM based method and TextCNN
Methods
SVM Based Method
TextCNN

Training time
2,469s
3,936 s/epoch, 10 epoch

Testing time
0.023s
0.034s
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3.4

Chapter Summary
Social media platforms have facilitated illicit drug trading and may be an important

driver of the current opioid epidemic. Thus tools for monitoring and analysis of online drug
markets are needed to advance epidemiological studies and develop intervention applications. In this part, we used the Google+ platform as a proof-of-concept to demonstrate
that machine-learning-based methods allow for efficient identification of illicit drug advertisements from social media posts. Our tools could be used by health care practitioners,
law enforcement officials and researchers to extract and analyze the data relted to the opioid abuse epidemic, which can be examined to better understand dynamics of online drug
markets, trade, and behaviors. These insights are essential in the development of tailored recommendations and public health intervention strategies that are responsive to social media
and online environments.
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PART 4

COMPUTATIONAL APPROACHES TO DETECT ILLICIT DRUG ADS
AND FIND VENDOR COMMUNITIES WITHIN SOCIAL MEDIA
PLATFORMS

4.1

Introduction
Drug overdose deaths have risen sharply over the past few years according to Mor-

bidity and Mortality Weekly Reports from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC) [91]. CDC recorded 70,237 drug overdose deaths in 2017, a 10 percent increase in
drug overdose deaths from the prior year [91]. Drug overdose deaths represent an important
public health priority area for prevention efforts. In this chapter, we show our published
work with several slightly modifications [8].
One driver of the drug epidemic is enhanced drug accessibility and promotion that is
facilitated via the Internet. Online drug trading platforms have emerged and are flourishing [2]. Social media platforms prove to be a popular venue whereby vendors can post
illicit drug ads with relative ease, expansive reach, and with little cost. On the consumer
side, drug users are able to search and find numerous vendors selling a wide range of illicit
substances complete with drug information, user reviews, and encrypted web-based sale capabilities [3, 4]. Unlike traditional street drug transactions, eCommerce enables illicit drug
vendors to connect and complete sales orders with drug users via social media, which bypasses direct personal contact entirely and essentially makes illicit drug sales as efficient and
effective as any other online purchase. Results from a national survey on social media use
from [5] indicate that an estimated 70% of U.S. adults ever use social media. In our research,
we found that illicit drug ads are ubiquitous within most social media platforms. Figure 4.1
shows sample collected from Flickr. Many ads contain vendors’ phone numbers, emails,
Wickr IDs, and websites that enable the ability for consumers to communicate with drug
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vendors and initiate a drug order sale transaction. The order can be directly delivered to a
specific pickup location without the disclosure of identifiable information. As such, effective
and efficient surveillance tools in digital platforms are needed to monitor the activities of
online drug sellers and prevent the increasing criminal use of the Internet to advertise illicit
drugs.
Another surveillance avenue distinct from ads is to discover active vendors through
detecting vendor communities. One confirmed active vendor would be helpful for law enforcement to identify multiple vendors linked by the same illicit substances automatically. It
would also contribute to disrupting the growth of illicit drug markets [15]. However, discovering the communities of vendors is a challenging problem since there is no direct connection
between vendors. Identifying meaningful communities in real-world networks has proven
to be a challenging task [16, 17]. In our research, we observed that a number of vendors
might sell an exclusive substance, such as fentanyl or heroin only. Our identification of
these vendors revealed their attempts to recruit distributors via social media posts. These
observations led to the discovery of vendor communities. For our purposes, a community is
classified as a group of nodes having more connections with the members in the same group
than in the other groups or the remaining of the network [18]. There may exist active connections for vendors in the same community which may reveal patterns of their corresponding
networks [19].
In this chapter, we have two goals: (1) to describe computational approaches developed
and deployed to identify illicit drug ads from social media platforms and (2) to describe a
computational approach developed in response to the discovery of vendor communities(based
on their shared drug categories). In particular, we select Google+, Flickr and Tumblr as
the data source for illicit ad detection and vendor communities detection. For ad detection,
we adopt two binary machine learning methods to detect the illicit drug ads from the text:
the support vector machine (SVM) based method and the convolutional neural network
(CNN) based method. The SVM based adopt term frequency-inverse document frequency
(TF-IDF) for feature selection [13]. The CNN based method is from [14], which designed
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Figure (4.1) Examples of illicit drug advertisements from Flickr
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to focus on text mining. One advantage of the CNN based method is that the features
can be automatically learned from the text data. For vendors’ communities detection, there
are three tasks. The first one is to identify the unique vendors across social platforms since
vendors may have different accounts on different social platforms. We assume the same phone
number on different social platforms from the same vendor. The second task is to extract
the drugs in the illicit drug ads. It is a big challenge to extract the drug names since the
illicit drug posts are in an unstructured form. A long-short term memory-based method [20]
is applied to extract drug names from unstructured posts to deal with this problem. The last
task is to figure out the communities of vendors. We build a bipartite graph by using drug
categories and vendors as two different types of nodes. The communities can be overlapped
since one vendor can belong to two or more communities. Thus an overlapping community
detection algorithm is needed. We adopt a matrix factorization based method [21] to detect
the communities of vendors. A workflow, the whole procedure of our work for illicit drug
ads detection and vendors community detection, is shown in Section 4.2.

4.2

Techniques

Figure (4.2) Workflow for ads detection and community detection

The workflow is shown in Figure 4.2. It contains two main parts: data acquisition
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and information acquisition. The first part, data acquisition, is the procedure of retrieving
data from digital platforms and detecting the illicit drug ads. This part includes three data
crawlers: Google+ Crawler, Flickr Crawler and Tumblr Crawler, and two illicit ads detectors:
SVM-based detector and CNN-based detector. The second part, the information acquisition, includes vendor information extractor, drug name recognition and vendor communities
detector.
4.2.1 Illicit ads detector
We applied two machine learning methods same to PART 3 to classify the posts retrieved
from social media: Support Vector Machine (SVM) based method and Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) based method. For both methods, the inputs are text data extracted from
posts, and the outputs are the predicted labels indicating whether each post is an illicit drug
ad.
4.2.2 Drug Named Entity Recognition: The LSTM-based Method
Named entity recognition(NER) is a problem of finding named entities in a given
text [34]. NER can recognize people, location, time, organization, numbers, and also support
finding customized items [34]. Accurately identifying the drug names in detected illicit drug
ads is a crucial part since the recognized drugs will be used to build a graph in our work and
thus it will directly affect the results of community detection.
Bidirectional long-short term memory with conditional random fields(BiLSTM-CRF) [20]
is one of the most widely used methods for NER. In our paper, we will apply BiLSTMCRF to complete the task of drug named entities recognition. BiLSTM-CRF contains two
parts: bidirectional Long-Short Term Memory(BiLSTM) networks and Conditional Random
Fields(CRF). Figure 4.3 shows the structure of BiLSTM with CRF [20]. For BiLSTM, it
connects two LSTM layers where the two layers have two opposite directions: forward and
backward. Generally, the forward direction can process the text from the beginning to the
end while the other one works from the end to the beginning. Both directions will give the
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results to the same output layer. In this way, the BiLSTM obtains merged hidden states from
both previous and next states. For CRFs, they are on the top of BiLSTM and the inputs of
CRFs are the hidden states from BiLSTM. CRFs are a type of discriminative classifier [35]
and they assign the probability to a label sequence is by [92]:

Pλ (Y |X) =

XX
1
exp(
λk fk (Yc , X, c))
Z(X)
c∈C k

(4.1)

where X is unsegmented characters sequence, Y is the label sequence, Z(X) is a term for
normalization, fk is a feature function, and c is index for the characters which being labeled
[92]. The CRFs consider the final sequence in sentence-level, which makes the prediction
more reasonable than without CRFs. For example, the result in Figure 4.3 before CRFs is
“B-Loc O O O B-Drug”. In CRFs, the whole sentence is considered, and then the result
is changed to “B-DRUG I-DRUG O O B-DRUG”. The “B-Drug” means the beginning of
a drug name and “I-Drug” indicates a word inside a drug name. The “B-Drug” means the
beginning of a location and “I-Loc” indicates a word inside a location. O stands for others.

Figure (4.3) Illustration of BiLSTM-CRF
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4.2.3 Community Detection
To deduce the relationship of vendors which is not possible from direct observations,
we apply community detection methods to partition the vendors into disjoint communities.
In our dataset, we build a bipartite graph since drugs and vendors are two different types.
We use Resource Description Framework(RDF) triple stores [93] to data in the following
format: “VendorId-sell-DrugName”. In a bipartite network, drugs form drug communities,
and vendors form vendor communities. A vendor community is composed of a group of
vendors where each pair of them should have a high possibility of selling the same drugs.
Meanwhile, there are overlappings in the real network, which means one vendor could belong
to two or more groups. Figure 4.4 gives an example of overlapping communities. The letters
in the square stand for communities, and the numbers in circles represent of vendors. The
vendor 3 and 4 in red circles could be in community a or community b or both; the number
6, 7 and 8 in blue circles could be in community b or community c or both.

Figure (4.4) Example of Overlapping Communities

An Nonnegative Matrix factorization(NMF) [94], the Cluster Affiliation Model for Big
Networks(BigClam) [21], is applied to detect the communities of vendors. BigClam is an
algorithm focus on discovering overlapping communities in large networks.
BigClam use a nonnegative weight Fuc to represent the weight between u and c, where
u is a node from node vector V and c is a community from community vector C [21]. Fuc
indicates the strength of affiliation for node u to c. Particularly, given Fuc = 0, we consider
u does not belong to c. The weight vector Fu represent the affiliation weights for node u
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to communities in community vector C. Figure 4.5 gives an example of matrix F . Fv2 is
a vector which store the strengths of node v2 to all communities; let d1 is a community,
Fv2 d1 is the strength of node v2 to community d1 . BigClam provide an equation to show the
probability of creating edge (u,v) which connects node u and node v:

P (u, v) = 1 − exp(−Fu · FvT ),

(4.2)

where P (u,v) will be 0 if Fu = 0 or Fv = 0 or both equal to 0. Higher P (u,v) means there is
a higher possibility that exists a connection between node u and v, which further indicates
node u and v have higher possibility in one community.

Figure (4.5) Explanation of F

Yang and Leskovec spot that F is the best approximates the adjacency matrix A of
graph G [21]. Therefore computing F can be solved by using matrix factorization method.
Nonnegative Matrix factorization(NMF) [94] is a widely used method for matrix factorization. NMF decompose a given matrix V into two matrix W and H which let the matrix V
have the approximation V ' W × H. The W and H could be computed by minimizing
the error function:

arg minkV − W × Hk,
where W , H ≥ 0. Meanwhile, the optimization of F can be achieved by:

(4.3)
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F̂ = arg max l(F ),

(4.4)

F ≥0

where
l(F ) =

X

log(1 − exp(−Fu Fv )) −

(u,v)∈E

X

Fu FvT .

(4.5)

(u,v)∈E
/

The Eq. 4.4 can be viewed as nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF) [94]. If using a loss
function D to replace the negative log-likelihood −l(F ), we have:
F̂ = arg min D(A, f (F F T )),

(4.6)

where D is loss function [21]. BigClam picks log-likelihood as a loss function [95] to complete
NMF. F will be iteratively updated until achieving the maximum likelihood in a gradient
ascent way. In 2017, Liu and Chamberlain provided a parallel way across multiple threads
to speed up BigClam, which achieved 2.5 times faster than unparallelized BigClam when
solving the Amazon product co-purchase network [96].
4.2.4 Hypergraph as Analysis Tool
A hypergraph is a generalization of a graph, where an edge, also named hyperedge, can
connect any number of nodes [97]. Comparing to a simple graph, hypergraph can clarify the
complex relationships among vendors and the communities of vendors [98]. Figure 4.6 shows
the simple graph and the hypergraph. Figure 4.6a shows an undirected graph where an edge
connects two vendors. This graph cannot tell us how many communities are shared for two
vendors. Figure 4.6b shows a hypergraph clarify the complex relationships among vendors
and communities. The nodes in a simple graph are connected by an edge if there is at least
one shared community. Due to one edge that can only connect two nodes in a simple graph,
we miss the information on whether one vendor belongs to three or more communities. To
avoid information loss, we use hypergraph to illustrate complicated relationships.
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(a) Simple graph

(b) Hypergraph

Figure (4.6) Simple graph vs. hypergraph

4.3

Experimental Results
In this section, we will show the results and evaluation of the methods. Most of the

tools have been implemented in Python 3.7, and run on a DELL workstation with Intel Xeon
E5-1603 2.80GHz CPU, 32G memory, and Ubuntu 18.04 OS. We also use MySQL and Neo4j
to store data.
4.3.1 Data Collection
We collected data from three platforms: Google+, Flickr and Tumblr. Google+ and
Flickr provide API to collect historic data. For Tumblr, we use Selenium to crawl the
data [99]. The analyzed dataset has been formed by posts containing at least one of the
following 30 keywords [89]:
opioid, alprazolam, amphetamine, antidepressant, benzodiazepine, buprenorphine, cocaine,
diazepam, fentanyl, heroin, hydrocodone, meth, methadone, morphine, naloxone, narcan,
opana, opiate, overdose, oxycodone, oxymorphone, percocet, suboxone, subutex, pill, rehab,
sober, withdrawal, shooting up, track marks
In total, 433,673 posts published from 2017/01/01 to 2017/12/31 have been collected.
We collected data in 2017 since we will further analyze the relationship between drug involved
death in each state and illicit drug ads in each state in future work. We labeled all the posts
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manually. The following examples illustrate examples of illicit drug ads from the dataset.
Ads 1-3 are selling illicit drugs while ad 4 is a normal post.
1. Buy Diazepam Online etc. Our products stand the best in the market in terms of
quality and pricing. We do sell at cheap prices and shipping is done expressly overnight
in USA and Canada upon discrete packaging. We also have very good wholesale prices
and regularly ship all over Europe and Australia. We also carry a wide range of
scientific research chemicals which are labelled not for human consumption.Payments
and other transactions are done securely with our company so clients are guaranteed
100% satisfaction. Also we provide a free catalog which contains relevant information
concerning the over 100 products we sell thus we invite everyone to get a free copy of
this catalog and learn more about our products.
2. Buy Tramadol Ultram online without Doctor’s prescription. Tramadol Pills Tramadol
(Ultram) relieves pain by modifying your brain’s response towards what would otherwise be painful sensations. As a prescribed drug, you need a doctor’s prescription to
buy Tramadol Online, which is also available under different brand names such as OLTram and Ultram. We provide a Tramadol 50 mg, 150 mg. Buy Tramadol online, Buy
Tramadol, Tramadol Uses; Side Effect, Buy Tramadol overnight without prescription,
Buy Tramadol Medicine Online, Tramadol online, Order Tramadol, Generic Tramadol,
Cheap Tramadol, Buy Tramadol 50 mg, Buy Tramadol 100 mg, Cheap Tramadol buy
usa, Tramadol overnight US.
3. Hello, I am a vendor in high quality pharmaceutical products like Xanax, Oxycodone,
Fentanyl patch, Viagra, Diazapam, Percoset, Opana, Methadone, etc and also high
quality medical marijuana strains like Og kush, Sativa, Kief,S hatter, Girls Scott,
Lemon haze, Moon rock, Afghan kush, Purple haze etc, my packaging is very safe and
discreet, also my delivery is 100% assured as we do refund or resend the same order
immediately in case of any unforeseen.
4. Highlighting concerns with the pharmaceutical supply chain, the Food and Drug Ad-
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ministration warned McKesson, one of the nation’s largest wholesalers, for failing to
properly handle episodes where pharmacies received tampered medicines, including
three ...
FDA scolds McKesson for naproxen in tampered oxycodone bottles -STAT4.3.2 Information Extraction from Detected Illicit Ads
Information Extracted Statistics Table 4.1 shows the extracted data statistics. We
obtained 514 unique vendors, even though we have 52, 832 detected vendors. We discovered
159 drug names, although we used 30 keywords to crawl the online data.
Table (4.1) Information Extracted Statistics
Data type
Original Posts
Detected illicit drug ads
Detected vendors
Filtered Unique vendors
Recognized drug names

Data size
433,673
84,332
52,832
514
159

Vendor Information Extraction Finding unique users from various social platforms
is a challenge problem [100]. However, there is a significant fact in our dataset: vendors have
to leave their contact information to make sure customers can reach them and thus they
post phone numbers or email addresses in posts. We assume the unique vendor has the
same contact information and thus unique vendor will be detected although most of them
use different account names across social media platforms, we select the contact information
to match users. The contact information includes phone number, email address, WhatsApp
ID, Wickr ID, etc.
We choose Regular Expression(RE) to extract contact information from detected illicit
ads. Several regular expression rules are generated to cover most cases(cannot cover all
cases) since the text data are unstructured. For example, the phone number in posts are
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404 − 123 − 4567, (404)123456, +1404123 − 4567, etc. We found 52,832 vendors and filtered
514 unique vendors based on our assumption.
Drug Name Entity Recognition for Drugs To recognize the drug names, we first
built customized dictionaries to train the model. The dictionaries were downloaded from
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) [101] and drug slang term list from [102].
These files are all open-source. Then we applied BiLSTM-CRF in the detected illicit drug
ads. The input of BiLSTM-CRF is the vectors of words, and the output is the predicted
labels for each word.
For efficiency, we selected 75, 899 illicit ads(90% of all illicit drug ads) as our training
data and the running time of training model is 865s per epoch with ten epoch; we apply the
model on 8, 433 drug ads which are the 10% of all illicit drug ads, and each ad cost 0.026s.
It implies that our trained model can efficiently recognize the drug entities.
To evaluate the effectiveness, for each post on which the model is tested, we calculate
the precision, recall and F-score for each entity that the model recognizes, which are 0.92,
0.89 and 0.90, respectively. It indicates that our trained model can effectively identify the
drug entities.
4.3.3 Community Detection
We built a bipartite graph to detect the communities of vendors by using the extracted
information. In this section, we first visualize a sample graph to show the relationship
between vendors and drugs, and then we apply the community detection method in the
bipartite graph. Finally, we discuss the detected communities of vendors.
Bipartite Graph We use Resource Description Framework(RDF) triple stores [93]
to store the relationship between vendor and drug in the following format: “VendorID-sellDrugName” based on the fact that each illicit drug post contains one vendor and multiple
drug names. Neo4j is used to store the data. Neo4j is a graph database and can easily
display the connectivities and relationships of data [103]. Figure 4.7 shows a sample graph
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generated by Neo4j. Green circles stand for the vendor, and the number of 740 is the vendor
ID; Brown circle in the center stands for the drug (the number of records is limited to 25).
This case is from a real illicit drug ad.

Figure (4.7) A sample graph shows the vendors selling fentanyl in Google+, Flickr, and
Tumblr

Community Detection Method Evaluation We implemented BigClam by importing Networkx package [104]. We put the drugs into nine drug categories, according to [105].
The BigClam starts with an initial matrix F and then iteratively updates F to maximize
the likelihood. We initialized matrix F by the following formula [96]:

Fu0 (N (u)) =


0


1 if u ∈ N (u) and







N (u) is a locally



minimal neighbor- ,






hood [106] of u




0 otherwise

(4.7)
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where N (u) stands for u and its neighbors. We also implemented another two state-ofthe-art methods for overlapping community detection in bipartite graph: Brim [44] and
BiTector [46]. For Brim, the community result can be found at an optimal value of Q [45].
For BiTector, it uses bi-cliques as the core ingredients to divide communities [47]. Brim and
BiTector are also implemented in Python.
The challenge in our experiment is that there is no ground truth to evaluate our result
since the network is formed from real social platforms. We first select modularity to evaluate
the structure of detected communities in a computational way. Then we built a hypergraph
to illustrate how it is used for law enforcement.
Modularity is a significant measure to evaluate the structure of networks. Newman
proposed the definition of modularity in 2004 [40]:

Q=

k
X

(eij − a2i ),

(4.8)

i=1

where ai is the possibility that a random edge can belong to community i, eij represent the
possibility that an edge with two end nodes is in community i and j, respectively. Furthermore, eii represents the possibility that the edge with two end nodes is all in community i.
Higher modularity means a better structure of the networks. Table 4.2 shows the results of
the three state-of-the-art methods in our dataset. We can see unparallelized BigClam has
the highest modular value. We also spot that the corresponding modular values from Brim
and BiTector is lower than the result from BigClam.
Table (4.2) Modular values for community detection
Methods
Unparallelized BigClam
BRIM
BiTector

Modular Value
0.6292
0.5831
0.4376
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Community Detection Result Discussion In our work, we generated edges to
connect vendors according to the affiliation weight matrix F calculated by BigClam. By
using a vector V to store the vendors and a vector E to store the edges, we can draw a
graph G = (V , E) in Figure 4.8. From this graph G, we spotted that there are nine main
groups. However, this graph G cannot reveal the overlapping communities of vendors. We
further built a hypergraph H = (C, V ) by using a vector C to store the communities(also
known as hyperedges in hypergraph).

Figure (4.8) Detected communities of vendors

The problem we want to figure out from hypergraph H is how the communities are
overlapped. We draw a degree distribution in the hypergraph to answer this question. The
degree of a vendor in hypergraph can be considered as the number of shared communities.
P
The degree of node v in hypergraph is defined as [107] d(v) = v∈V,c∈C w(c), where w(c)
is the weight of hyperedge c. In our hypergraph, for any hyperedge c ∈ C, w(c) is 1.0.
Figure 4.9 shows degree frequency histogram of hypergraph H. We can see there are more
than 200 vendors shared 2 communities, more than 80 vendors shared 3 communities. It
indicates that more than half of the vendors are shared two or more communities. The
maximum number of shared communities is 8, and the frequency is 2, which is also the
smallest frequency. It indicates that the two vendors are active in eight groups. This result
shows that our work would contribute to discovering the high influence vendors and thus
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disrupting the growth of illicit drug markets for law enforcement.

Figure (4.9) Degree distribution from hypergraph

Another problem we want to know is how the communities associate with drug types.
To figure out this, we built a maximum spanning tree by generating weight between vendors.
The weight is the number of shared communities between two vendors. For example, the
weight between node 1 and node 2 in Figure 4.6b is 2 since they share two communities:
c1 and c2 . According to these weights, we draw a maximum spanning tree in Figure 4.10a.
We observed separated groups in this maximum spanning tree since some communities are
not sharing the same drug. We checked this MST by analyzing the drug types sold in each
community. We found that for any isolated group, more than 86% vendors are selling the
same kind of drugs. In Figure 4.10b, we selected 43 vendors by zooming in Figure 4.10a and
found that there are 93% vendors sell drugs in the category of fentanyl.

4.4

Chapter Summary
Social media platforms offer a vast frontier for illicit drug eCommerce to thrive and may

represent an important enabler of the current opioid epidemic. Thus tools for monitoring and
analysis of online drug markets are needed to advance epidemiological studies of illicit drug
trading, which play a critical role in informing intervention and prevention applications.
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(a) Overview of maximum spanning tree.

(b) A case from attributed maximum spanning tree.

Figure (4.10) Maximum spanning tree from hypergraph.

In this paper, we demonstrate that machine-learning-based methods which can efficiently
capture illicit drug advertisements and detect communities of vendors. These tools hold vast
potential for health care practitioners, law enforcement officials, and researchers to extract
and analyze valuable data related to the opioid abuse epidemic, which can be examined to
better understand the dynamics of online drug markets, trade, and vendor behaviors. These
insights are essential in the development of tailored recommendations and public health
intervention strategies that align with the social media environment.
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PART 5

A CROWDSOURCING BASED FEDERATED LEARNING TO KEEP USER
IN THE LOOP WITH PRIVACY PROTECTION

5.1

Introduction
According to the digital 2020 US report [108], there are 5.10 billion unique mobile

phone users, 4.54 billion internet users, and 3.80 billion active social media users. People
can access information easily ever than before. On the other hand, malicious information
also surrounds people, including clickbait, illicit ads, spam emails. Therefore, analyzing such
data is an urgent need. Today, most machine learning models utilize supervised learning in
practice. A labeled data is prepared to train a machine learning model to predict future
data. The labels can be binary or multiple tags [109]. For example, a label for a message
might indicate whether a text is a regular one or a clickbait which harmful to the user.
Human-in-the-loop (HITL) is one way to label the available data. Figure 5.1 shows a
cycle of HITL in machine learning. When users view posts, they can report whether they
are spam or not. Thus, the server obtains more labeled data and could improve the current
model’s performance, which in turn, provides better service to users.
However, most of these applications require collecting users’ data from multiple kinds of

Figure (5.1) HITL Structure
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IoT devices into the data center [110], which inevitably increases the chance to touch clients’
private data [111]. Collecting users’ data to the central server will cause a privacy leak. There
is no denying that many researchers provide plenty of algorithms to protect users’ privacy in
various aspects. It is generally recognized that clients’ privacy is a significant problem since
the data privacy-related laws are published or prepared [112]. For instance, the European
data protection rules, designed by EU data Protection Regulation, began to take effect on
May 25, 2018 [113]. In 2016, Federated Learning (FL) [23] provided an innovative way to
train the model by distributing the model to the clients’ devices and avoid the server directly
collecting data into the data center.
In this part, we designed a structure that utilizing the crowd-sourcing idea to ask the
help from our users, and applying federated learning settings to protect users’ privacy. We
use TextCNN in our experiment to evaluate the performance of TextCNN in FL. Our contributions are:
• By asking users to report malicious data, more data could have participated in the
training process. Users are in the loop, and in turn, users can feel that they are in a
clean online world;
• To protect users’ privacy, we applied federated learning in our framework to avoid
collecting user’s data into servers;
• Our framework allows people in the loop to contribute to the community; on the other
hand, users further trust our model.

5.2

Algorithm Overview: Federated-based TextCNN
We present our framework, which is called federated learning based TextCNN. Figure 5.2

shows an overview of our method. We modify the FedAvg on account of the fact that the
user can provide and report the label locally. The server randomly selects users at each
round and then distributes the latest global model to users. Users provide their reports
locally without uploading them to the server. The global model from server then uses the
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Figure (5.2) Structure of Cluster-based FedAvg

local data to complete the training procedure. To avoid using too much computation powers
on the user side, we set the model’s layers to a small number, i.e., five layers. The local
well-trained models are aggregated on the server-side as follows [23]:

wt+1 =

Ua
X

i
pi wt+1
,

(5.1)

i=1

where pi is [23]:
pi =

Si
,
S

(5.2)

Si represents the data sizes in ith device, S is total samples size, wt+1 is the model parameters
at t + 1 round.

5.3

Experiments
In this section, we present the details of the federated settings and the experiment

results. The experiments are completed in Python 3.7, and deployed on a server with Intel
I9-9820x 3.30GHZ 64GB CPU, GeForce RTX 2080 Ti GPU, 32G memory, and Ubuntu 18.04
OS.
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5.3.1 Data Source
We conduct experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach on two
benchmark datasets: spam dataset, and tweet dataset. We also applied our framework on
the data retrieved from Google+. The data are all divided into two categories. The labels
are all Yes or No. The Tweet dataset [114] is tweet posts dataset which consists of 10875
hand classified posts. The SMS spam dataset [115] is a set of SMS tagged messages that
have been collected for SMS Spam research. It contains one set of SMS messages in English
of 5,574 messages, tagged acording being ham (legitimate) or spam. We also selected 5574
posts from Google+ posts which collected in Part 3, which contains 747 illicit ads.
Table (5.1) Experiments setup for 100 users.
Data set
Tweets
SMS spam
Collected Google+ Post

Settings
Samples per user negative data ratio
108
0.43
55
0.13
51
0.13

5.3.2 Experiments Setup
To verify our proposed approach, we intentionally sampled the data evenly. We distributed the training dataset to 100 users. The data distributions are stored in a separate
text file when the sampling is done which ensure that the training procedure with different
parameters are running on the same data distribution. In TextCNN, we set the parameters as follows: max sequence length 20, embedding dim 200, validation split 0.16, test split
0.2 [88]. We set the total rounds E to 200. According to the [23], we also set the fraction a
to 0.1 which means the server picks 10 of 100 users at each round.
5.3.3 Experiments Results
To illustrate our experiments’ results, we first evaluate the effectiveness of our framework
and then show its efficiency compared to FedAvg in a particular simulation environment.
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(a) Training loss from Tweet

(b) Training loss from SMS spam dataset

Figure (5.3) Training loss from SMS spams

Efficiency To evaluate the efficiency, we look into the training loss from Tweet dataset
and SMS spam dataset at each round, which is shown in Figure 5.3. The results show that
the Tweet dataset obtains a stable training loss at round 35, and the SMS spam data reaches
nearly stable at state 25. Overall, our framework can efficiently accomplish the objective.

(a) Tweet dataset

(b) SMS spam dataset

Figure (5.4) Testing accuracy from ground-truth dataset

Effectiveness In Figure 5.4, we present the testing accuracy distribution in the two
workbench datasets. The x-axis is testing accuracy and the y-axis is the proportion of the
corresponding testing accuracy in the 100 clients. The accuracy from Tweet reaches 0.70 at
round 80, and the curve from SMS spam reaches 0.97 at state 50. This clearly shows that
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our framework can train a well-performed model under the federated learning settings, with
the users in the loop.
We are also interested in the training accuracy for the real posts collected via Google+
API. Figure 5.5 shows the results from the Google+ posts. We set the word embedding size
to 35 and 500 for comparison. The results show that they have similar trends. Both of them
become stable around stage 40, which gives us the guideline to use a smaller word length to
finish training a model on the user side without requiring powerful computing resources.

(a) Embedding size = 35

(b) Embedding size = 500

Figure (5.5) Testing accuracy from real Google+ posts

5.4

Chapter Summary
Now we are living in a data-driven world. Users perfer getting information online but

there are malicious information everywhere. AI would be an engine to help us to tag and
filter those illicit posts. One bottleneck is from the labelling data. In this part, we design
a novel framework that allow user particite in the loop with privacy protection by applying
federated averaging on TextCNN. The simulations on two ground truth datasets and selfcollected dataset show that our new system can effectively detect the dishonest user. The
global model trained in our framework can achieve convergence effectively and efficiently.
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PART 6

A WEIGHTED FEDERATED AVERAGING FRAMEWORK TO REDUCE
THE NEGATIVE INFLUENCE FROM THE DISHONEST USERS

6.1

Introduction
As stated in Part 5, we can ask users to help us or give users the option to mark the

posts. However, it requires collecting users’ data from multiple kinds of IoT devices into the
data center [110], which increases the chance of private data leakage [111]. In this chapter,
we show our work to deal with dishonest users by slightly modifying our published work [9].
We assume that the selected devices are honest and aggregate the returned models
without detecting the attackers or dishonest clients. However, in some FL applications, the
fake local model has brought much harm in aggregating the demand of the shared model.
First, it slows down the convergence of the global model, which wastes a large number of
computing resources and communication time. Second, it acts as noisy that reduce the
accuracy of the global model.
To deal with this problem, we design a system to evaluate each user’s credit to detect
the attackers or dishonest devices. The difficulty lies in how to effectively pick up those give
the noisy to our model without treat the honest to the bad one. In this paper, we prepare a
test dataset to verify every returned local model, give a weight based on the testing accuracy
and then apply a time series averaging method to give weight to each user to merge into the
global model. The natural idea comes from finding out the poor performance returned local
models through a testing procedure. Although it seems add extra steps and in turn cost
extra time, the whole procedure will definitely boost the convergence of the global model
due to the high demand of the communication cost. Our experiments show the difference in
details. It can be said with certainty that out method can not only speedup the convergence
of the model but also reduce the affect from the attackers or dishonest devices. Our main
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contribution are as follows:
• We design a evaluation system to compute user’s credit to detect the dishonest devices.
The dishonest devices with poor performance will not participate the aggregation of
the global model.
• We designed a new strategy that consider the historical performances from each round
as time series and use Exponential Moving Averages (EMA) to calculate devices’
weights.
• We can also detect normal users but with special events happened such as offline
suddenly, device power off, etc. The strategy can skip these users at current stage but
re-consider them after several rounds if they turn into normal condition.

6.2

Algorithm Design
In this section, we present the details of our framework in this section.
6.2.1 Overview: Self-weighted Federated Averaging
We design a credit score grading system to evaluate users’ reliability and then give

different weights to users. Instead of randomly choosing devices in each round and then
treating them equally without checking out the negative influences from some unusual users,
we evaluate the returned models at each round and then give the weights based on the
performance.
Figure 6.1 shows the structure of our framework. We first select users from the available
users with equal opportunity and send the global model. After all, devices have finished the
training, before averaging the returned gradients, we run the local models on a test dataset
and use the testing accuracy to evaluate the models’ performance. Moreover, we use the
exponential moving average [116] method to compute the score for users. The global model
can then be aggregated and updated according to the credit score. The procedure repeats
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many times until the global model’s performance is stable. Our objective is minimizing the
summation of prediction losses from all devices with corresponding weight:

minw f(w) =

U
X

Wi pi Fi (w),

(6.1)

i=1

where Wi stands for the computed credit score ith device.

Figure (6.1) Algorithm framework

6.2.2 The Grading System Designing
We design this grading system to calculate the weights for each client by evaluating
their overall performance. The system considers the current users’ testing accuracy and uses
a time series method to obtain a relatively balanced weight for every user. Mainly, there
are two stages to compute the score for each selected client in our proposed grading system.
The first part tests the returned local model’s performance on the testing dataset, and the
second part is maintaining and updating a global matrix to grading the credit score to each
user.
Testing Accuracy as Grading Factor Every round, a specific number of devices
will be randomly selected to participate in training and then return the locally trained model
to the server.
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Before sending the local model to the server for aggregating demand, we first apply the
returned models to a testing dataset. The performance is evaluated by the testing accuracy
directly. Generally, those returned fake models cannot achieve satisfying testing results.
Historical Scores as Round Series Data However, directly using the current testing results as the weight to mark a user as dishonest is not accurate since some normal users
may return a ’fake’ model occasionally due to the bad connection, the complex communication condition. To avoid this, we consider the historical testing results from previous rounds
to grade the credit score.
We maintain a grading matrix G storing the testing results. Each row stores each users’
performance, and each column indicates each round. The element in this matrix is git , which
is the testing accuracy tested by the local model trained on ith device at rth round. After
we get the latest testing accuracy, we calculate an overall credit score for each client with it
along with their historical data by using the exponential moving average (EMA) [116]. It is
worth pointing out that our data is round series, which can be considered as time series if
we mark each round as a time point.
Exponential Moving Average is one of the most popular techniques to deal with timeseries data. Unlike moving average treat every data point equally, the EMA method gives a
higher weight to recent observations than the older one. It is computed by [116]:

Wit = αgit + (1 − α)Wi(t−1) ,

(6.2)

where Wit means the computed weight of ith device at rth round, git is the testing accuracy
for ith device at rth round and the Wit−1 is previous round’s weight. By default, we set
the alpha to 0.9 to reach the purpose of giving relatively higher weight to the most recent
points. Wi0 could be initialized by computing gi0 . We mitigate the recent older results
from exponential computing and give relatively more weight to last weights. This formula
gives us a flexible solution to detect unusual users. The regular users with special events
happened may be marked as dishonest at the current stage, but they can be re-participate
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the training when they have a reasonable performance again. In other words, the past data
are not that important for the latest weight. For dishonest users, they are still be blocked
if recent performances are still weak. The most recent data is more heavily weighted. The
pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Grading Score Algorithm
Input: wt+d , h, N
1: Server executes:
2: t ← 0;
3: initialize w0 , G
4: for t = 0, ..., T − 1 do
5:
St ← (indices of ua randomly selected clients from n)
6:
server send wt to r selected clients
7:
for i in St do
i
8:
gie ← (testing accuracy from the wt+1
)
9:
koptimal ← k
10:
Update G
11:
Wit ← αgit + (1 − α)Wit−1
12:
end for
13: end for

6.3

Experiments
In this section, we present the details of the federated settings and the experiment

results. The experiments are completed in Python 3.7, and deployed on a server with Intel
I9-9820x 3.30GHZ 64GB CPU, GeForce RTX 2080 Ti GPU, 32G memory, and Ubuntu 18.04
OS.
6.3.1 Data Source
We select two ground-truth datasets, MNIST and CIFAR-10, to evaluate the difference
between the FedAvg and our proposed framework. The MNIST dataset [117] is a handwritten
digits dataset where images are classified into 10 classes. The dataset consists of 60, 000
training images and 10, 000 test images [117].
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The last image dataset, CIFAR-10, contains a smaller size than the previous two, with
50, 000 images for training and 10, 000 images for testing. The images are in 32 × 32 pixel
intensities [118].
6.3.2 Experiments Setup
We compare our framework with FedAvg in a particular environment that there are
dishonest users. For the simulation, we have two kinds of users. The first type of user is
the regular user, and the second one is the dishonest user. We select five dishonest among
a total of 100 users as fraudulent users. All dishonest users have a 5 percent opportunity to
be selected each round in our experiments.
According to [23], we set similar parameters of the Convolutional neural network (CNN)
in our federated settings. We set the total round E to 100, the  to 0.5. We distribute the
images to 100 users, and we randomly select ten users as a dishonest user. At each round,
we intentionally choose one untrustworthy user who will return the fake model to the server.
6.3.3 Experiments Results
To illustrate our experiments’ results, we first evaluate the effectiveness of our framework
and then show its efficiency compared to FedAvg in a particular simulation environment.
Effectiveness In Figure 6.2, we show the detected dishonest users for the MNIST.
The x-axis is the IDs of returned local models, and the y-axis is the testing accuracy of the
corresponding local model before aggregation. The commons users are marked as green dots,
and the detected unusual user is red ’x’. It verifies our assumption that the unusual user
can be effectively detected based on the testing results.
Following the procedures introduced in the previous section, different weights will be
given to the returned models, and then be merged and calculated with historical weights
together. The global model then is aggregated based on the latest moving averages rank.
Table 6.1 shows the final global model testing accuracies. The higher accuracy is in bold.
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Figure (6.2) MNIST testing accuracy at round 100

We can see that our framework has higher final accuracies at round 100 than the FedAvg’s
under our simulation that there is one dishonest user per round.
Table (6.1) The final global model testing accuracies at around 100.
Data set
MNIST
CIFAR-10

Testing Accuracy
FedAvg Credit-based FedAvg
0.91
0.95
0.19
0.49

Efficiency The Figure 6.3 shows the training loss from the two benchmarks. The
x-axis indicates which round and the y-axis is the corresponding training loss. For all two
datasets, we can see that our credit-based FedAvg curves become stabilized earlier than
FedAvg, and the training loss are higher than the FedAvg curve. For dataset MNIST,
compared with FedAvg, our credit-based FedAvg curve stops fluctuating around round 58,
and for CIFAR-10, it is around 73. However, for all two datasets, the FedAvg curves are all
still fluctuating. Thus, the figures lead us to the conclusion that our framework efficiently
trains the global model.
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(a) MNIST

(b) CIFAR-10

Figure (6.3) Training loss with E = 100

6.4

Chapter Summary
The global model’s performance could be affected by dishonest users or attackers who

returned the fake local trained models to the server. We design and implement a credit score
grading system to give users dynamic weights to mitigate the influences from the fake local
models before the server aggregates the global model. We test the returned local models on
the testing dataset and then use the exponential moving average method to calculate the
latest users’ weight. The simulations on two ground truth datasets, MNIST and Cifar-10,
show that our new system can effectively detect the dishonest user. The global model trained
in our framework can achieve convergence effectively and efficiently.
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PART 7

A CLUSTER BASED METHOD TO ACHIEVE FAIRNESS IN FEDERATED
LEARNING

7.1

Introduction
As stated in Part 5, we can ask users to help us or give users the option to mark the

posts. In Part 6, we proposed a weighted federated learning method to deal with dishonest
users or attackers. However, FL applications generally face non-independent and identical
data (non-i.i.d) [25] and unbalanced data. It is also a challenge for the global model to obtain
good performance across different devices. For FedAvg, naively selecting samples from all
clients evenly may provide the advantage of better performance over some of these devices.
However, selecting samples could decrease the model performance on some of the devices,
although the average accuracy may be good enough. For instance, Figure 1.2 shows the type
of photos people posted on Instagram [26], and there are 5 clusters with a different number
of users. The size of cluster 5 in Figure 1.2 is 7.3 times the size of cluster 4. The global
model learned from FedAvg could be biased toward the users from cluster 5 since around
half of the participants at each round may be from cluster 5.
In this part, we show our published work that finding a fair solution to train a global
model with a similar performance on every device [10]. Considering that groups of clients
have similar behaviors or features, we organize the clients into groups, give each cluster
a weight according to the clustering results, and then select the participator across these
clusters to train the global model. We adapt the hierarchical clustering to deal with the
problem that the number of clusters is unknown. The clustering method’s input is from
the training weights, which ensure no raw data is exposed. Meanwhile, to make sure the
global model achieves a similar performance across different devices, say, fairness, we reduce
the number of the clients in larger groups to be selected to participate in training, and at
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the same time, increase the number of participators from small groups. In this way, minor
devices’ accuracy is improved significantly at the low cost of the majority devices’ accuracy.
Each device’s accuracy is similar to the average accuracy, which accomplishes our goal, fair
to every device. Our contributions are:
• For unbalanced data, we provide a fair solution while keeping the average accuracy not
lower than FedAvg by modifying the way the samples are selected.
• We explore a way to cluster users without exposing users’ raw data. The contents and
private information are all local, and clients are blind to each other.
• We also demonstrate that our framework can achieve a low and stable variance of
training accuracy faster which indicates that our framework can train the global model
efficiently.

7.2

Algorithm Design
In this section, we first provide an overview of our model, then explain our methods in

details, and finally show our proposed algorithm in Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3. Table 7.1
shows the notations we used in the rest of this chapter.
7.2.1 Overview: Cluster-based Federated Averaging

Figure (7.1) Structure of Cluster-based FedAvg
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In order to provide a fairness solution, here we present our framework which is called
cluster-based FedAvg. Figure 7.1 shows an overview of our method. We run the FedAvg
first without clustering, and every stage is exactly the same as the FedAvg, where we first,
randomly select devices, then send the global model to the selected devices, and finally
average the returned gradients. When FedAvg is nearly stable, we start clustering. After
clustering, in contrast to FedAvg, the server changes the approach from randomly selecting
devices from all devices to selecting devices according to the partitions.
Table (7.1) Notation table
Notation
U
a
Ua
U0
K
ck
Uck
UK
E
N
Ni
η
gi
w
acc
t
St
Ck
d

Meaning
Total number of devices.
A fraction to control the number of devices
to be selected in each round.
The number of selected devices in every
round.
Total number of testing devices
Total number of clusters
kth cluster
The number of devices in kth cluster
The number of devices to select from each
cluster
Total rounds to run
Total data size
The data size in ith device
Learning rate
Local average gradient
Training weight
Accuracy
At t round
A set contains the indices of selected clients
Clustering results corresponding to the k
Before clustering, every d round to check out
the model is stable or not

We modify the FedAvg and propose cluster-based FedAvg on the account of the fact
that the global model could have a variable performance on an unbalanced distribution of
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devices. For example, for 100 independent devices: 70 devices contain pets images while 30
devices contain landscape images, it is more likely that the global model is biased towards
the images of the pets. However, considering we divide all devices into several groups and
the server picks same samples from each group, it could give a fair opportunity for every
client to participate in training the global model. The bias towards the device from a larger
proportion could be mitigated. Formally, the definition of fairness in our framework which
is inspired by Li. et al. [82] is:
Definition 1 The fairness of a shared global model learned from the set of selected devices
in several rounds is evaluated by how relative the accuracy tested from different devices is,
to the average accuracy [119], say, the variance of accuracy. Model M is fairer than model
M 0 if the variance v of accuracy from M is smaller than the variance v 0 from M 0 [82].
According to Definition 1, the low variance indicates the accuracy on each device is close
to the average, which clearly indicates that the global model reaches a fairness performance.
Thus, we define our objective is to minimize the variance of accuracy:

minV ar(acc) =

U
1 X
(acci − acc)2 ,
U i=1

(7.1)

where acci is the global model accuracy on ith device, U is the total number of devices
and acc is the average accuracy from U devices. Our experiments demonstrated that a low
variance can be achieved by equally selecting devices from each group, which improve the
accuracies from the minority group (cluster) significantly at a low cost of the accuracies from
the majority group (cluster):

|accFlarge − accCFlarge | < |accFsmall − accCFsmall |,

(7.2)

where F stands for FedAvg, CF stands for cluster-based FedAvg, acc means accuracy.
To achieve this objective, there are three main components that have been developed
in the proposed method. First, we defined a trigger to stop FedAvg and then automatically
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start clustering. Then, we use hierarchical clustering by means of Silhouette score to refine
the classification result. Lastly, we show how we select the samples according to the clustering
results to reach a fairness solution.
7.2.2 Clustering Startup
We create a trigger to start the clustering once the testing accuracies of FedAvg are
nearly stable. Every d rounds, the global model will run on a testing dataset to verify
that the model is stable or not. The clustering procedure begins if (acc(t+2d) − acct+d ) ≈
(acc(t+d) − acct ), where acc is the test accuracy on testing dataset.
7.2.3 Hierarchical Clustering with K Decision
When the number of groups is unknown, hierarchical clustering, a classical clustering
algorithm where sets of clusters are created, is the most popular and widely used method
[120]. There are two subcategories of hierarchical clustering [120]: 1) agglomerative approach: initially, each node is a cluster and eventually these clusters will merge into one
cluster according to their similarities; 2) divisive approach: at the beginning, one cluster
contains all nodes, and at the end of the clustering each node belongs to one cluster. We
use the agglomerative method since it is less complex than divisive.
The input to the clustering function is the parameters that each local model trained,
which ensures no raw data are exposed during training process. For example, in a two-layer
CNN model, we can choose the weight matrix in the hidden layer w1 and another weight
matrix in the output layer w2 as the input of the clustering.
The best clustering results and the optimal number of clusters K can be determined by
maximizing the value of the Silhouette score [121, 122]. It not only measures how close the
objects are within the same group but measures how well-separated a group is from other
groups as well. A higher score means a better clustering result. This method also does not
require any external information, which helps in automatically calculating the optimal K.
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The Silhouette coefficient is defined as follows [122]:

s=

(lex (i) − lin (i))
,
max(lex (i), lin (i))

(7.3)

where lex (i) depicts the mean distance from device i to all devices in the nearest cluster, lin (i)
stands for the average distance between device i and the rest of devices within its cluster.
The Silhouette score is between −1 and 1. A value close to 1 implies that the result is close
to its ground truth. Whereas, a value smaller than or equal to 0.25 indicates no substantial
structure has been found [123].
Algorithm 2 Hierarchical Clustering with K decision
Input: wt+d , h, N
1: Server executes:
2: smax ← 0.0, clusterF lag ← FALSE
3: Kmax = h × N
4: for i = 2, ..., Kmax do
5:
k, Ck ← hierarchical clustering
6:
computes s
7:
if s > smax then
8:
smax ← s
9:
koptimal ← k
10:
end if
11: end for
12: if smax > 0.25 then
13:
clusterF lag ← TRUE
14: end if
15: return Ckoptimal , clusterF lag

The pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 2. We define the largest number of clusters
by Kmax = h × U , where h is a float number. Normally, the h is 0.1 which indicates
there are at most

U
10

clusters. The Silhouette score, represented by s, is computed at every

step when hierarchical clustering divides the previous clusters into more partitions. The
current Silhouette score is compared to the global variable maximum Silhouette smax , and
the larger one is saved in smax . Meanwhile, the corresponding K is the current optimal
number of clusters. The clustering will be stopped when there are Kmax clusters. If the final
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max Silhouette score is larger than 0.25, cluster-based samples selection procedure starts;
otherwise, FedAvg continues, because no obvious clusters has been found.
7.2.4 Sample Selection based on Results from Clusters
Once the clustering is completed and the clusterF lag is T rue, the number of devices
to be selected from each cluster can be computed as follows:

UK =

Ua
,
K

(7.4)

where Ua is the total number of users to be selected in each round, and UK is the number
of devices to select from each cluster. For example, assume that the sizes of clusters are: 70
and 30, then we randomly pick the users from each group according to the ratio: 50 : 50.
The reason we select the same number of devices from each group (cluster) is to give a fair
solution to every device. Before clustering, irrespective of whether a device is from a large
group or a small group, the possibility is always:

P =

Ua
.
U

(7.5)

However, more devices in large groups can participate in training than those in small groups.
Take the example in section 3.2, in FedAvg, around 7 devices containing pet images and 3
devices containing landscape images will be selected for each round. However, the devices
from small partitions deserve a higher possibility than those from the large group:

P =

UK
UK
<P =
,
Uc1
Uc2

(7.6)

where the number of users Uc1 in group c1 is larger than Uc2 . In this way, more devices from
the small group could be selected if we use UK . Thus, the accuracy of the minority could be
improved at the expense of the majority.
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7.2.5 Algorithm Procedure
The pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 3. There are three main stages in our framework:
FedAvg before clustering, clustering when triggered, and cluster-based FedAvg.
Algorithm 3 Cluster-based FedAvg Algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:

Server executes:
t ← 0, clusterF lag ← FALSE, isStable ← FALSE
initialize wt=0 End Function
acct ← (testing result by w0 )
temp ← 999
for t = 0,..,T -1 do
if clusterF lag is TRUE then
St ← (indices of Ua evenly selected clients based on c)
else
St ← (indices of Ua randomly selected clients from n)
end if
server send wt to selected clients
for i in St do
i
← (client locally train wt )
wt+1
end for P
a Ni
wi
wt+1 ← Ui=1
N t+1
if (isStable IS NOT TRUE) & (t mod d is Integer) then
i
acct+d ← (testing result by wt+1
)
if (acc(t+d) − acct ) ≈ temp then
isStable ← TRUE
Ckoptimal , clusterF lag ← (Clustering)
else
temp ← (acc(t+d) − acct )
end if
end if
end for

We use a variable clusterF lag that is returned by Algorithm 2 to indicate whether the
server selects samples from all devices or from each group. The default value of clusterF lag
is F alse, and it is set to T rue once the clustering is finished and the max Silhouette score
is larger than 0.25.
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7.3

Experiments
In this section, we describe the experimental setup and results. Most of the tools have

been implemented in Python 3.7, and run on a DELL desktop with Intel i7 8700K 3.70GHz
CPU, GTX1070 8GB GPU, 32G memory, and Windows 10 OS.
7.3.1 Data Source
We conduct experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach on three
benchmark datasets: MNIST, Fashion MNIST and CIFAR-10. The data from the three
benchmarks are all divided into ten categories. The MNIST dataset [117] is a handwritten
digits dataset which consists of 60, 000 training images and 10, 000 test images [117]. The
Fashion-MNIST [124] is a grayscale image dataset, which has the same size as the MNIST.
For the CIFAR-10 [125], it includes 50, 000 training images and 10, 000 testing samples. All
of datasets could be downloaded via PyTorch [126].
7.3.2 Experiments Setup
To verify our proposed approach, we intentionally sampled the data unevenly. We
distributed the training dataset to 100 users, with 70 virtual clients receiving the data with
the labels from 0 to 6 while 30 virtual clients got the data with the labels from 7 to 9.
We also distributed the testing dataset to 100 testing users with the same settings as the
training users. The data distributions are stored in a separate text file when the sampling
is done which ensure that the two methods run on the same data distribution. We set the
total rounds E to 100. According to the [23], we also set the fraction a to 0.1 which means
the server picks 10 of 100 users at each round.
7.3.3 Experiments Results
Effectiveness Table 7.2 shows the average accuracies and variances from the three
benchmark datasets. Overall, the variance of testing accuracy of cluster-based method is
lower than the one from FedAvg, and the average testing accuracy from our cluster-based
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(a) MNIST

(b) Fashion MNIST

(c) CIFAR-10

Figure (7.2) Variance curve with E = 100
Table (7.2) Average accuracies and variances with E = 100
Data set
MNIST
Fashion MNIST
Cifar-10

Average Accuracy
FedAvg Cluster-based
0.95
0.96
0.76
0.81
0.40
0.49

Variance
FedAvg Cluster-based
32.04
4.76
400.46
303.89
240.76
129.27

FedAvg is a little higher than FedAvg. In Figure reffig:variance3in1, we present the testing
accuracy distribution in the three datasets. The x-axis is testing accuracy and the y-axis
is the proportion of the corresponding testing accuracy in the 100 clients. The curve is fit
to kernel density estimation (KDE) [127] which creates a smooth curve given a set of data.
We spot that there are two crests from each curve in Figure 7.2 which from two unbalanced
separated groups that we intentionally did in the experiments setup. This clearly validates
the incentive we claimed in Section 3, that selecting samples from each group could mitigate
the variance of the accuracy. Moreover, we look into the optimal K automatically calculated
by Silhouette score. Table 7.3 shows the optimal value for the datasets and the correspond
Silhouette score.
We are also interested in the exact accuracy for the two methods from each client.Figure 7.3
shows the results from the three benchmark datasets for the accuracy comparison from each
client. We observed that the clustered method has a little lower or similar accuracy for
the clients from larger proportion, but it significantly improved the accuracy of the minor
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Table (7.3) Silhouette scores from Clustering
Data set

Optimal K

Average Silhouette score

MNIST

2

0.62

Fashion MNIST

2

0.41

Cifar-10

2

0.34

group which in turn reduced the whole variance of the training accuracy. This is a trade off
that improving the minor’s accuracy significantly by scarifying the performance of the larger
group slightly.

(a) MNIST

(b) Fashion MNIST

(c) CIFAR-10

Figure (7.3) Concrete testing accuracies from 100 users

The results demonstrate that our framework can effectively reduce the variance to ensure
the global model performs similar on every clients. Meanwhile, our work also shows that
average accuracy from our framework is a little higher than FedAvg.
Efficiency To evaluate the efficiency of clustered-based FedAvg, we further look into
the concrete variance value at each round, which is shown in Figure 7.4. The results show
that the variances of training accuracies from our method converge faster than FedAvg. For
MNIST, both methods can converges around 60 stage but the variances from our method
keeps lower than the one from FedAvg. For Fashion MNIST and Cifar-10, we spotted the
variances from our method converge at 80 round and 90 round, respectively, but the variances
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from FedAvg are still not stable. Overall, our framework can more efficiently accomplish the
objective than FedAvg.

(a) MNIST

(b) Fashion MNIST

(c) CIFAR-10

Figure (7.4) The convergence of training accuracy variance in 100 round

7.3.4 Results Discussions
Our proposed method is mainly to reduce variance to satisfy fairness by carrying out
selecting participator across clusters. The experiments shows that our method can effectively
and efficiently reduce the variance significantly over three benchmark datasets. The welltrained global models have similar performance for different users no matter which partitions
they belong to. This achieves our goal of resolving the discrimination concerns and satisfying
fairness [78].
Table (7.4) The average accuracy in each group.
Data set
MNIST
FashionMNIST
Cifar-10

Group No.
Group 1
Group 2
Group 1
Group 2
Group 1
Group 2

FedAvg
0.97
0.89
0.83
0.65
0.46
0.28

Cluster-based
0.96
0.97
0.87
0.76
0.47
0.55

Difference
-0.01
+0.08
+0.04
+0.11
+0.01
+0.27

We successfully accomplished our purpose mainly because sometimes there is a trade-
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off in sacrificing the accuracy of the major group to improve the accuracy of the minor
group [128]. The shared model benefits some individuals at the cost of the others [80]. The
difference of average accuracy between FedAvg and cluster-based FedAvg from group 1 and
group 2 are highlighted in Table 7.4. Group 1 contains 70 users and group 2 only have 30
users. The average accuracies from group 2, the minor group, are improved significantly at
low cost or no cost of group 1. From the Table 7.4, we clearly see that the average accuracies
from group 2 are similar to group 1, which means that the testing accuracies for most users
are close to the overall average accuracy in our framework. The computational approach of
variance then easily evaluates the results of fairness of the global model. A small variance
clearly indicates that the testing accuracy tend to be close to the average accuracy which
means that the performance of the global model on each device is similar to each other. It
further implies that there is no discrimination of the shared model, say, fairness.
There are mainly three reasons for the model reaches a fair performance. In the system
designing level, we divide the users into different partitions and give the majorities and
minorities the same weight [128] since we would like the trained global model to be unbiased
to the members of these groups. In the selecting procedure, our proposed method select
samples according to the clustering results which ensures the sample in small group can be
equally selected. In the aggregation process, the original FedAvg has already considered the
impact of data size which gives weight to different user [23].

7.4

Chapter Summary
We proposed a novel framework called cluster-based FedAvg to train a fair global model.

We use hierarchical clustering to divide users into different partition since the number of
clusters is unknown, and adapt the training weights as the input of clustering method to
avoid exposing raw data. The fairness is achieved by improving the accuracies of the device
from small group at the expense of the one from large group. The experiments demonstrated
that our framework can train a fair shared model effectively and efficiently. In the future,
we consider changing the fixed weight to a dynamic one in a low cost energy, and extending
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the framework to accept new devices/clients dynamically.
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PART 8

CONCLUSIONS

More and more peopla are now using social media. Users perfer getting information
online. However, social media platforms have facilitated illicit drug trading and may be an
important driver of the current opioid epidemic. Thus tools for monitoring and analysis of
online drug markets are needed to advance epidemiological studies and develop intervention
applications.
In our work, we first used the Google+ platform as a proof-of-concept to demonstrate
that machine-learning-based methods allow for efficient identification of illicit drug advertisements from social media posts. Our tools could be used by health care practitioners,
law enforcement officials and researchers to extract and analyze the data relted to the opioid abuse epidemic, which can be examined to better understand dynamics of online drug
markets, trade, and behaviors.
We then demonstrate that machine-learning-based methods which can efficiently detect
communities of vendors. These tools hold vast potential for health care practitioners, law
enforcement officials, and researchers to extract and analyze valuable data related to the
opioid abuse epidemic, which can be examined to better understand the dynamics of online
drug markets, trade, and vendor behaviors. These insights are essential in the development
of tailored recommendations and public health intervention strategies that align with the
social media environment.
However, one bottleneck is from the labelling data. Thus we further design a novel
framework that allow user participate in the loop with privacy protection. The simulations
using TextCNN in the fedreated settings on two ground truth datasets and collected dataset
show that our new system can effectively detect the dishonest user.
Nevertheless, the global model’s performance could be affected by dishonest users or
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attackers who returned the fake local trained models to the server. We design and implement
a credit score grading system to give users dynamic weights to mitigate the influences from
the fake local models before the server aggregates the global model. We test the returned
local models on the testing dataset and then use the exponential moving average method to
calculate the latest users’ weight. The simulations on two ground truth datasets, MNIST
and Cifar-10, show that our new system can effectively detect the dishonest user.
Meanwhile, we proposed a novel framework called cluster-based FedAvg to train a fair
global model. We use hierarchical clustering to divide users into different partition since the
number of clusters is unknown, and adapt the training weights as the input of clustering
method to avoid exposing raw data. The fairness is achieved by improving the accuracies of
the device from small group at the expense of the one from large group. The experiments
demonstrated that our framework can train a fair shared model effectively and efficiently.
In the future, we consider using simple and easy models on users’ side to save the
computing power. It also saves the communication cost. The embedding models could be
one way. We also consider ask server do more complex jobs, like using a sophisticated model.
The returned local models from users are valuable. We can design algorithms to reduce the
loss when aggregating local models in the server side. One possible designing is from the
knowledge distillation. Furthermore, we can also ask user leaving or joining the traning
dynamically, unlike our current works are all based on fixed user size.
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